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H

ybrid threats represent a very real security challenge for the United States
military in the coming decades. They combine the strengths of an irregular
fighting force with various capabilities of an advanced state military, and will
play an increasingly prominent role in international security issues. What are
the attributes of a true hybrid threat, how do they function, and how can they be
countered before they even emerge? Much of the existing literature dealing with
hybrid threats focuses on “what” and “who” they are, both in the present day
and in the past. What is needed is a methodological attempt to identify where,
and in what capacity, these organizations will emerge over the coming decades.
This article describes a methodology to more readily identify an emerging hybrid adversary. The methodology examines the current understanding
of hybrid threats and their capabilities, and the identification of three necessary core variables of a hybrid threat organization: maturity, capability, and
complex terrain. The “sweet spot” where these variables overlap is the point of
maximum tactical, operational, and strategic effectiveness for a hybrid threat.
By superimposing these three variables on a possible threat, we can gauge that
organization’s potential to develop into a true, mature hybrid adversary. We
also see the exact circumstances that would enable this development, and can
consider how to assist or impede that development.

Understanding Hybrid Threats
There is no consensus definition of hybrid threats—in the open press
or military lexicon. They are defined in the US Army’s Training Circular 7-100
as “the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces,
and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.”1
Authors Frank Hoffman, Nathan Freier, John McCuen, and Helmut Habermayer
proposed similar definitions for this type of organization. Their definitions of a
hybrid threat include the ability to engage effectively in multiple forms of war,
simultaneously.2 William Nemeth also compellingly discusses hybrid adversaries and hybrid warfare, demonstrating how armed groups from less-developed
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societies tend to incorporate more advanced adversaries’ technologies and
tactics in new ways that are more effective than originally intended.3
The pitfall for numerous studies related to hybrid threats and hybrid warfare is that they set the aperture too wide in identifying who and what a hybrid
threat is. It is only natural that every armed force will use any and every means
available to it. In many instances, the armed force may employ a variety of capabilities while achieving little actual effect from any number of them. For example,
an insurgent group may launch cyberattacks, engage in acts of terrorism, or take
part in organized criminal activities. This only means they are similar to virtually every other modern insurgent group. Everyone engaged in armed conflict
will attempt to conduct cyberattacks, irregular warfare, information warfare,
innovative use of off-the-shelf technology, and other spectacular attacks to the
maximum extent possible. One needs to be cautious in simply defining a hybrid
adversary as any that engages in multiple forms of warfare, because this can
include just about every type of organization from criminal gangs like MS-13 to
the German Wehrmacht. If everybody is a hybrid, then nobody is.
The true hybrid mix of advanced military capabilities and organizational
maturity is normally not commonplace among armed groups around the world, nor
is it easily attained. Consequently, it is important to understand if we can predict
how and when an armed group becomes a fully developed hybrid adversary.
A fully developed hybrid adversary will be able to transition between
irregular or guerilla war, and highly conventional warfare in company- or largersized formations at will. Specifically, as RAND researcher David Johnson
writes, a true hybrid adversary will be able to engage opposing military forces
effectively at a distance, and force them to fight through an extended engagement area to get into the close fight.4 In addition, they will employ a wide range of
capabilities including cyber, social media, secure communication, organized and
transnationally networked crime, and advanced technologies such as unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs). In the future, they may even utilize robots.
Not only will they possess these capabilities, but they will be competent
in using them. This “middle range” of capabilities—less than a modern state
military, more than a guerilla or insurgent force, with aspects of both—makes
hybrid threat organizations problematic for advanced western militaries.5
Hybrid organizations maintain a relatively loose, cellular nature. They maintain
close links with the populace that make insurgency, terrorism, and organized
crime so challenging to defeat. Their advanced combat capabilities make them
more than a match for many military forces that are not equipped and trained
for modern joint combined arms fire-and-maneuver warfare.6
These hybrid threat organizations do not simply spring into being, but
develop and evolve in very specific and predictable ways. The notion of an
evolutionary progression of development for armed groups is not new. Peter
Underwood deals with this evolution in his examination of pirates, Vikings, and
Teutonic Knights. He finds that armed groups can progress along a spectrum
from minimally organized bands motivated by easy profit on one extreme, to
highly organized militants driven by fanatical ideology on the other.
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Between these two extremes is a spectrum of progression in which an
armed group will gradually become less focused on short-term profit seeking. The
armed group becomes more oriented on attaining political power and military
capability to better promulgate their ideals. Underwood refers to this as a “maturing” process. He finds that groups cannot move along this spectrum without the
involvement of an established political power—in modern times, a state sponsor.7

Capability
To operate as a hybrid threat, an organization needs to have at least
some of the capabilities of a modern, conventional military. For purposes of this
study, a group is credited with possessing a capability when it has:
•• A particular type of weapon or technology in significant numbers, e.g., antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS).
•• The training to use them effectively.
•• The capability to maintain sustainability.
For example, groups with a supply of ATGMs should also be able to
prepare, aim, and fire the weapons effectively, as well as understand their tactical use against a particular armored target—not an intuitive series of tasks, as
any infantryman will testify.8 Even if they are able to make adequate use of their
ATGMs in individual attacks, are they able to use this weapon in concert with other
capabilities as part of a larger operation?9 And if they are able to do this, are they
able to get more ATGMs once their available supply is expended, or maintain them
if they are not currently needed? If the answer to any of these and other questions is
“no,” then the group’s ATGMs are “an event—not a capability,” to paraphrase the
strategic visionary David Johnson.10
Where can an organization acquire these capabilities and the know-how
to support them? In a number of cases, the weapons, training, and sustainment
may already be present in the form of a failing state’s military. After state
collapse, members of that military may doff their uniforms and coalesce into a
rapidly formed hybrid threat organization. They retain the ability to continue
using their existing military capabilities but are now unfettered by the demands
of supporting a decrepit state apparatus. This dynamic was seen in Chechnya
in the 1990s, and to a degree in the Sunni nationalist insurgency in Iraq from
2003-07. These military forces move “down” the spectrum depicted in Figure
1 into the hybrid sweet spot, likely gaining in combat effectiveness as they do
so, until finally receding below the threshold as their capabilities are expended.
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Figure 1: Hybrid Threat Intersection

State collapse is also the scenario by which a hybrid threat would most
likely gain access to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). WMDs would
require the same prerequisites as any other capability, but by their nature they
tend to require rare, specialized, and expensive training and sustainment, and
may be difficult for a hybrid adversary to maintain as a capability. In addition, a hybrid’s possession of WMDs would elicit a particularly heavy military
response from world powers. Whether or not a hybrid threat organization
armed with WMDs could be deterred in the same manner that states can be
is uncertain. State sponsors can be deterred from providing these capabilities
to their hybrid proxies, and recent history seems to bear this out. Hybrids that
acquire their WMDs through state collapse, however, may not respond to the
same stimuli that influences states.
State collapse is infrequent, so in most cases, an organization will need
to acquire advanced weapons, training, and support from a state sponsor. The
dynamics of state sponsorship and proxy warfare have filled any number of
books.11 Suffice it to say here, that a state sponsor will provide support to the
extent that it feels its proxy group represents an effective means to a strategic
end. It will gauge its level of support according to how safe, and in accord with
its overall interests, an investment in a particular group is. It will calculate in
terms of that group’s alignment or responsiveness to the sponsor’s desires, and
that group’s ability to effectively achieve those desires.
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Lebanese Hezbollah is perhaps the best current example of a state
proxy whose sponsor, Iran, has provided the capabilities necessary to operate
as a hybrid threat.12 On the other hand, Shiite extremists in Iraq, often affiliated
with Jaysh al Mahdi, provide an example of groups who received only marginal
support from their Iranian state sponsors. Iran never provided those organizations with any widespread operational capabilities greater than explosively
formed penetrators (EFPs) and some relatively minor training and technical
expertise.13 The juxtaposition in capabilities between these proxies, sponsored
by the same state, is telling. Why did Iran provide more advanced capabilities
and support to Hezbollah than it did to Shiite insurgents in Iraq? The reasons
are many, but have much to do with the different internal dynamics within these
proxy organizations, and their ability to attract and use capabilities provided.
No state wants to invest resources in a proxy organization that cannot or
will not predictably assist in achieving its strategic ends. The degree to which
a sponsoring state is deterred by outside actors from a high level of support to
a proxy is also a critical factor. Yet, here again, the predilections of that proxy
group will factor into the sponsor’s calculations of risk versus gain. Essentially,
in order to attract a high degree of state sponsorship and the capabilities this
can bring, an organization must possess the maturity to make that sponsorship
a good investment.

Maturity
Group maturity is important if an organization is to become a hybrid
actor. Maturity includes:
•• Degree of organization and cohesion.
•• Depth of leadership.
•• Responsiveness to internal leadership and foreign state sponsors.
•• Population support.
•• Extent to which the group is goal-oriented with an effective strategy.
Group maturity increases along a spectrum depicted in Figure 1,
from the level of mass demonstrators and criminal street gangs, through more
sophisticated organized crime groups and militias, paramilitary organizations,
and then to guerilla or insurgent forces that can operate as effective units below
the company level.14 As these organizations increase past this level of capability
and organization, they begin to enter the sweet spot range where they present
the most effective means to a sponsor’s strategic ends.
This level of maturity implies a degree of organization and leadership
where there are fewer single points of failure. Key leaders and even entire units
can be killed and captured with relatively minimal loss of overall capability. A
mature armed group will have achieved unity of effort, cohesion, and responsiveness to its leadership’s goals and directives. It will have largely purged its
ranks of conspicuous rogue elements and renegade factions. The organization’s
strategic goals will transcend simply making money or settling old scores,
although these will still be crucial activities.
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Although ideological motivation is important in the development of
organizational maturity, excessive adherence to ideology may actually hinder an
organization’s maturity. Extreme ideologies may impede the organization from
the appropriate degree of pragmatism, warding away advanced support from
probable state sponsors. Organizations that “take orders from God” normally
are not sufficiently responsive to a state sponsor’s strategic ends. Al Qaeda is
a good example of this, because of their ultra-extreme ideology and inherent
uncontrollability. In addition, a particularly savage or nihilistic outlook can
have obvious tactical and psychological benefits for any armed group, but will
also tend to alienate popular support (potentially even leading to a backlash),
incur a stronger response from adversaries, and increase the degree of risk and
uncertainty for a potential state sponsor. Abu Musab Zarqawi and al Qaeda in
Iraq are the perfect examples, but this is also a factor hindering groups such as
Los Zetas in Mexico from becoming a true hybrid threat.15
The term “maturity” is not synonymous with “age.” Nevertheless, there
is an interesting possibility that a hybrid threat organization may not be able
to fully mature unless it survives the end of the conflict that gave birth to it,
enjoying a period of respite prior to engaging in a subsequent conflict. This
breathing space between conflicts will give the organization a critical respite
in which to deepen its leadership, strengthen its organization, purge rogue elements, and train its members. It is important to note that this period of respite
is rarely peaceful and will likely involve low-level irregular warfare, terrorism,
or similar activities. Indeed, these activities are critical to the strengthening
and training processes, as well as in maintaining the group’s ideological and
political relevance. The respite period should, nonetheless, be a genuine reprieve
from the constant attrition inherent in open warfare, to a greater extent than
that offered by simply having sanctuary.16
A hybrid threat group may eventually mature beyond the sweet spot
and develop into a full-fledged national military at the successful conclusion of
a conflict. In this case, they risk becoming just another third-world army, losing
their edge in ennui, bureaucracy, and petty corruption. Conversely, a successful
hybrid might become dissipated in warlordism and fratricidal infighting, particularly if they were relatively low on the maturity spectrum or were already
on a downward trajectory as is often the case in a rapidly formed post-collapse
hybrid. This dynamic can be seen in the aftermath of the first Chechen War,
and could potentially occur in the event of hybrid activity in a post-collapse
North Korea.17 The commonality is that while it is difficult for an organization
to reach the hybrid maturity sweet spot, it is even more difficult to remain there
for an extended period. The natural tendency will be to grow beyond the sweet
spot, or to sink below it.
Of course, like all human groups, hybrid threat organizations are a
product of their environment. Capabilities are not accrued and exercised, nor
is maturity acquired, in a vacuum. Hybrid threat organizations are normally
linked to the terrain within which they exist and operate. The very complexity
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of that terrain may be a critical factor in determining whether a true hybrid
threat can exist.

Complex Terrain
Complexity of terrain is the third factor enabling a mature, capable hybrid
threat to achieve success against a modern military. Used here, the term “terrain”
includes human as well as geographic terrain. It is almost intuitive that complex
terrain is critical in enabling a hybrid adversary to effectively confront a modern
military opponent. The less complex the geographic and human terrain, the
more a modern western military will be able to leverage its advantages in size,
materiel, and technology to gain a decisive advantage.18 One good example of this
was Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, 2008. The Israeli Defense Force took advantage of terrain to isolate Hamas forces in urban areas, reducing their operational
effectiveness.19 Another example can be seen in the conflicts in Chechnya, where
Chechen hybrid forces generally ceded control of the region of Chechnya north of
the Terek River to the Russians, because the Chechens “cannot fight effectively
against them on the steppes.”20
In addition to enabling a hybrid threat’s tactical and organizational abilities, complex terrain provides sanctuary by impeding a modern military’s ability
to conduct effective targeting. It also puts additional strains on a modern conventional military’s organizational, logistical, communications, and transportation
capacity. The more complex the terrain, the more it must be taken into account
by every member of a military, from a staff planner to an infantry soldier picking
his way through a jungle, slowly climbing a mountain, or shouldering through a
crowded slum.
Another area of terrain that is now truly coming into its own is cyberspace. A hybrid group’s cyber capabilities may enable it to take advantage of
the complex terrain of cyberspace in the same manner it leverages physical and
human terrain. Cyber capabilities include conducting network attacks, recruiting, information operations, and financial operations.21 Future hybrid threat
organizations may or may not be as comfortable and capable operating in the
rapidly developing and amorphous cyber realm as their state adversaries, but it
is certain that they will make the attempt.
Figure 1 depicts terrain complexity as increasing along a continuum
from high desert (a mechanized military’s ideal battleground) to highly complex
terrain consisting of dense urban areas in close proximity to broken, hilly, wooded
terrain, or jungle. The terrain of an urban megalopolis such as Karachi, Lagos, or
Mexico City would be even more complex and would challenge the abilities and
capacity of any military.
The spectrum also measures the complexity of human terrain. Human
terrain increases in complexity from a single cultural group in a sparsely populated rural area on one end of the spectrum, to multiple mutually hostile ethnic
or religious groups in open conflict on the other. A hybrid threat organization
will almost certainly draw its strength primarily from a specific racial, ethnic,
religious, ideological, or similar cohesive group. For this cohesive cultural
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group to have a motive to engage in conflict in the first place there must be some
sort of pre-existing tension or disparity within that society, some “wrong” that
they want to right. A degree of tension with other groups also serves the hybrid
group’s purpose in maintaining its ideological underpinnings. This, in turn,
will provide it with popular support, recruiting, propaganda, and sanctuary.
Complexity of both geographic and human terrain is closely linked to
the operationally defensive nature of hybrid warfare. Hybrids have many of the
same qualities as an irregular fighting force or even an insurgency, making it
almost impossible for them to operate effectively without close links to local
populace or familiarity with local terrain. Deprived of these, they lose many of
the tactical advantages of the defense, their weapons and logistical capabilities
become less effective, and they lose the ability to shelter from their adversary’s
targeting. They need to be the “home team” if they want to win. For this reason,
hybrid adversaries rarely, if ever, pose an invasion threat to foreign states because
they lose the advantages of complex terrain when they abandon it and attempt to
operate as a fighting force outside their home region. That said, they will invariably undertake acts of terrorism, rocket attacks, cyberattacks, and other tactical
offensive actions against their opponent’s homeland if they are able.
As with maturity, the extreme end of the complex terrain spectrum may
be detrimental to a hybrid threat organization. An organization that is forced to
expend too great a percentage of its energy controlling a mega-city, or scores of
isolated tribal valleys, and that is forced to constantly combat strong rivals, will
not be able to develop the organizational depth and focus required to survive as
a hybrid actor. Quite simply, if these conditions pertain, the hybrid organization
has diminished value to the sponsoring state as a strategic proxy and it will
likely lose support and revert to an irregular actor.
Once again, the zone of greatest benefit for the hybrid threat organization is where human and geographic terrain are complex enough to provide
it with popular support and defensive advantage, but not so complex that the
hybrid itself must struggle to master the terrain.

Overlap of the Three Variables
Figure 1 depicts the overlap of these three variables – capability, maturity, and complexity of terrain—that combine to create a hybrid adversary. They
are particularly strong within the sweet spot, delineated by the black line, at the
intersection of the three variables. If one or more of the variables for a given
group is short of—or beyond—the sweet spot, then that group will not be able
to present a fully-developed hybrid threat capability. Movement along the spectrum is in both directions. Again, it is perfectly feasible that a group would move
“down” the maturity spectrum from a state military to a hybrid threat, which
may increase its operational and tactical effectiveness, at least temporarily.
The figure is also a useful template for predicting which existing or
emerging organizations could potentially develop into a hybrid threat in the
next decade. Due to the requirement for organizational maturity, it is unlikely
that a hybrid adversary in the coming years will simply coalesce from nowhere.

46Parameters

Identifying Emerging Hybrid Adversaries

Rather, any hybrid adversaries that become active in the next decade will
almost certainly develop from armed groups that already exist, or from within
the military and security infrastructure of a very particular set of failing states.
The template can be applied to a potential hybrid threat (e.g., a postcollapse North Korea) to gauge its likelihood to fall within the sweet spot
intersection of all three variables. If a particular group is approaching the intersection, then this can focus intelligence and planning efforts on that particular
group or area.
These efforts go beyond merely planning how to fight or counter that
particular group should it ultimately develop into a full-fledged hybrid threat.
Clearly, it would be more effective to devote resources toward preventing a
potential hybrid adversary from reaching the sweet spot. Primarily, efforts to
degrade that group’s maturation and to disrupt its accumulation of capabilities
need to be taken. Although complex terrain would be a more difficult variable
to affect, it may be possible in a few cases to increase the complexity of the
human terrain by nurturing a muscular rival organization or otherwise shifting the balance of strength within that society. Such actions could demand a
disproportionate degree of the hybrid group’s resources and efforts, pulling it
out of the sweet spot. Finally, in a number of cases, a potential hybrid may be
co-opted as a useful proxy if the strategic circumstances permit.
It is important to remember that hybrid adversaries are not necessarily
more dangerous or powerful than other types of armed groups. Their most
valuable asset is their ability to surprise an unprepared opponent, one who
is trained and equipped particularly for one end of the spectrum of conflict,
or one who cannot overcome a preconceived framework of “conventional or
counterinsurgency.” A military that retains both joint combined-arms fire
and maneuver capabilities, as well as the flexibility and population focus of a
counterinsurgency campaign, will have the requisite tools to succeed against a
hybrid adversary.
If there is a shortcoming of the predictive methodology in this article,
it is that an assessment of a group’s status is somewhat subjective, particularly
with regard to maturity. This could be remedied to a significant degree by a
series of additional studies. Applying this method to a potential hybrid threat and
consolidating the assessments of subject matter experts on that group’s current
and potential placement on the three variables, would improve predictability.
Alternatively, one might assign the variables to historical cases in an effort to
validate the methodology. If enough cases are studied, regression analysis might
be applied to test the three independent variables defining the sweet spot in each.
Along with the oft-mentioned examples of the Israeli Defense Force’s
experiences in Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2008, the American experience in
Iraq in 2003 is a useful case study of combat between a conventional western
military and an adversary attempting to fight as a hybrid threat. The Iraqi forces
of Saddam Hussein attempted to organize and fight against the US-led coalition
invasion in a manner that many would call hybrid. They included conventional
formations, tanks, artillery, and missiles. They also included “Saddam’s
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Fedayeen” and foreign irregular fighters, suicide attacks, the use of human
shields, information and media campaigns, and outreach to American celebrities and Arab populace. Saddam was believed to possess chemical weapons,
and had already demonstrated a willingness to undertake “environmental war”
by blowing up oil wells during the first Gulf War in 1991.
The US-led coalition crushed this seemingly robust hybrid threat in
one of the most lopsided military campaigns in history. This was primarily due
to two factors. The first is that the coalition, and particularly American forces,
approached and fought this campaign through joint combined-arms fire and
maneuver. This enabled them to handle with relative ease whatever the Iraqis
threw at them, be it T-72 tanks, suicide bombers, or infantry swarming tactics.22
Second, although the Iraqis attempted to organize and fight in a hybrid
manner, they were not able to achieve the synergy and effectiveness of other
recent hybrids, such as the Chechens or Hezbollah. They were hobbled by an
incredibly inept and ineffective political-military structure. They lacked the
technology and know-how to make full use of emerging information and communications media on the battlefield (although this would come later during
the insurgency.) They lacked effective, widespread standoff fires capability,
such as advanced ATGMs. Much of the initial fighting took place in the south,
where the terrain is flat, the populace had no love for the Baathist regime and
generally lived in small, dense, easily bypassed cities, all of which favored the
mechanized coalition forces. These and a variety of other factors prevented
the Iraqi forces from forming a hybrid threat that was more than the sum of
its parts. Their shortcomings in capability, maturity, and terrain helped lead to
their defeat in the initial campaign, and are a reminder of just how difficult it
really is to create a strong and capable hybrid fighting force.
Of course, after the initial campaign, coalition forces quickly found
themselves in increasingly dire straits, a tale far too long and complicated to be
told here. Although it enabled them to handily defeat Iraqi hybrid forces on the
battlefield, American forces’ initial singleminded focus on high intensity conventional combat certainly played a part in the ensuing debacle. Obtuse dealings
with the Iraqi populace helped set the stage for years of bloody insurgency. Once
again, it is vital for a military to retain the flexibility of both its joint combined
arms fire and maneuver capabilities, and its mindfulness to the local populace.
It is among this populace that future warfare will inevitably take place.

Conclusion
Hybrid threat organizations will play an increasingly prominent role in
international security issues in the coming years. Operating in highly complex
terrain and combining many of the strengths of an irregular fighting force with
various capabilities of an advanced state military, these hybrid threat organizations could confront the United States military in the near future.
This article proposes a methodology through which likely future hybrid
adversaries can be more readily identified through three core variables of a
hybrid threat organization. Examining the sweet spot where the variables of
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maturity, capability, and complex terrain overlap makes it possible to gauge a
particular organization’s potential to develop into a true hybrid threat.
This will also make it more feasible to see the exact circumstances that
would enable this development, and how to assist or impede that development
as strategy dictates. This methodology provides a good starting point for additional research that can provide a tool for in-depth analysis of particular groups
in support of intelligence and planning efforts.
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